The Performance of Militaries in Humanitarian Demining by Paterson, Ted
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 14 
Issue 1 The Journal of ERW and Mine Action Article 11 
April 2010 
The Performance of Militaries in Humanitarian Demining 
Ted Paterson 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and 
Conflict Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paterson, Ted (2010) "The Performance of Militaries in Humanitarian Demining," The Journal of ERW and 
Mine Action : Vol. 14 : Iss. 1 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol14/iss1/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 
authorized editor of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
38         feature | the journal of erW and mine action | spring 2010 | 14.1 14.1 | spring 2010 | the journal of erW and mine action | feature         39
There are few documented examples of militaries performing efficient and ef-fective humanitarian demining1 when 
working under a military chain of command. 
The Geneva International Centre for Humani-
tarian Demining found only a handful of stud-
ies in which a direct comparison could be made 
between HD by militaries versus nongovern-
mental organizations or commercial firms.2 
The studies surveyed concluded that mili-
tary units performing HD were less produc-
tive, far more expensive and worked to lower 
safety standards. 
The clearest comparison derives from an 
evaluation of the United Nations Mission 
in Ethiopia and Eritrea3 where similar tasks 
were conducted by demining units serving 
within the peacekeeping force and by civilian 
organizations working under commercial con-
tracts. Cost-effectiveness comparisons were 
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Studies indicate that humanitarian demining under civilian oversight is safer and more 
cost-efficient than humanitarian demining under military oversight. This article pro-
vides examples supporting such evidence, cites possible exceptions, and explores 
reasons for performance inadequacies in military demining units.
calculated for both area demining and road 
demining tasks, and are summarized in Table 
1 below.
In brief, demining by military units was be-
tween 25 and 60 times more expensive than 
demining by civilian contractors working in 
the same country at the same time, and on sim-
ilar tasks. In addition, U.N. peacekeeping forc-
es did not demine to International Mine Action 
Standards in 2004,4 and as areas not demined 
to IMAS are not considered safe for civilian 
use by organizations that adhere to IMAS, the 
demined areas may have needed re-clearance 
before release. 
Evidence also shows that military units were 
less effective than civilian operators in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. From March–June 1997, U.S. 
Special Operations Forces conducted training 
for 450 members of the Entity Armed Forces.5 
The training was based on military procedures, 
Area demining Military Civilian
Unit Cost Ratio
Military: Civilan
“Best case” for military $15.44/m2 $0.61/m2 25 : 1
“Worst case” for military $47.00/m2 $0.79/m2 60 : 1
Road demining
“Best case” for military $25,543/km $727/km 35 : 1
“Worst case” for military $5.99/m2 $0.10/m2 58 : 1
table 1: Cost comparisons for humanitarian demining from ethiopia and eritrea
Deminers training for peacekeeping duties.
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and the United Nations Mine Action 
Centre did not accredit the EAF for 
humanitarian demining. Approxi-
mately six months later, Special Op-
erations Forces returned to deliver 
another series of training courses to 
new EAF recruits, this time work-
ing closely with UNMAC and using 
its humanitarian-demining training 
guidelines. Following this training, 
the EAF reached HD accreditation 
in June 1998.
The graph on the next page sum-
marizes the EAF demining casu-
alties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
From 1997 to early 1998, the person-
nel trained in military-demining 
procedures sustained 29 casualties, 
19 of which resulted in death or se-
rious injury. After 1998, the EAF 
personnel trained under UNMAC 
training guidelines for humanitar-
ian demining and suffered no de-
mining casualties from 1998–2001.6 
Exceptions may be found in the 
future wherein military deminers, 
working under a military chain of 
command, will perform as well as 
or better than civilian operators. 
In Vietnam, for example, army 
demining units and military-
owned firms conducted extensive 
unexploded-ordnance survey and 
clearance operations in support of 
infrastructure and other invest-
ment projects.7 However, GICHD is 
unaware of any thorough comparison 
of costs or of Vietnamese demining 
standards relative to IMAS. 
Performance differentials docu-
mented by the United Nations Mis-
sion in Ethiopia and Eritrea and in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina do not stem 
from a lack of skill on the part of 
military demining personnel, many 
of whom have gone on to successful 
careers with NGOs and commer-
cial operators. In addition, military 
1
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demining units working under civilian authorities have 
proven to be an effective solution in a number of coun-
tries, including Azerbaijan,8 Chile,9 Ethiopia10 and Yem-
en.11 The key in such cases appears to be the existence of 
a board of civilian officials (such as a National Mine Ac-
tion Authority) which sees demining as essential for the 
country. It ensures that capable mine-action managers 
are in place, along with incentives for these managers 
to deliver safe, efficient and effective demining services. 
The finding that humanitarian demining is general-
ly less productive and more costly when conducted by 
military units than by civilian operators is mirrored 
in the humanitarian-assistance field. For example, the 
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 
concluded that “… military air transport is four to eight 
times more expensive than commercial air transport. 
Thus in those instances where military aircraft operat-
ed over the same routes as functioning road transport 
routes ... the use of military aircraft to carry cargos that 
could have travelled by road was between 20 and 40 
times more expensive.”12,13
Such findings should not be a surprise. Militaries have a 
different mandate from civilian organizations. In military 
operations, failure to achieve the principal objective can 
spell disaster for the unit, the entire military force and the 
nation as a whole. Accordingly, militaries spare no costs to 
achieve their strategic objectives, even if it means that per-
formance on other measures—such as efficiency or cost 
per unit—is sacrificed. Military demining operations are 
not designed to be judged against the performance rules 
of the humanitarian-demining industry.
Increasingly, Western militaries have recognized that 
significant savings can be made by contracting civilian 
organizations to work under commercial incentives. 
They now make far greater use of civilian contractors 
for such tasks as transportation, facilities manage-
ment and administration. Recent years have also seen 
a number of initiatives to enhance the contribution that 
military units make to humanitarian-demining opera-
tions. In November 2003, for example, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council issued an important statement on mine 
action, including: “The Security Council recognizes the 
contribution that peacekeeping personnel can make in 
the areas of mine risk education and demining and calls 
upon troop-contributing countries, where appropri-
ate, to train selected personnel to demine in accordance 
Demining casualties of the entity Armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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with the International Mine Action 
Standards.”14 Since the evaluation of 
the UNMEE Mine Action Coordina-
tion Centre, military demining units 
serving in U.N. peacekeeping mis-
sions have required accreditation 
from UNMAS and must conduct 
their operations in compliance with 
IMAS. Improvements have also 
been made in coordination and 
information exchange between mil-
itary and civilian operators with-
in peacekeeping missions. Efforts 
are also underway in a number of 
NATO member states toward the 
harmonization of mine-action doc-
trine and standards, at least within 
peacekeeping and stabilization op-
erations, and within the context of 
humanitarian emergencies.
Situations remain in which mili-
tary demining units working under 
a military chain of command should 
or must be used, even though they 
would not be the cheapest or most 
productive solution. Such scenarios 
include operations in highly insecure 
environments and when very rapid 
emergency response is required, in 
which case militaries generally have 
far greater capacities than any civil-
ian organization can muster. In other 
cases, fostering military-to-military 
contacts is the primary objective, 
and humanitarian-demining activi-
ties are simply a means to this end. 
Studies show that demining con-
ducted under civilian oversight pro-
vides the safest, most effective and 
cost-efficient option. Thus, militaries 
should be trained to humanitarian 
standards and operate under civilian 
oversight when engaged in humani-
tarian-demining operations.
See Endnotes, Page 82 
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